WELLINGTON Retreat to Alfaiates – Wellington
at Alfaiates
Rickard, J. (5 June 2008) Combat
of Aldea da Ponte, 27 September 1811, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/combat_aldea_da_ponte.html
The combat of Aldea de Ponte of 27 September 1811
was a rearguard action fought during Wellington’s retreat from Fuente
Guinaldo to Alfayates in the aftermath of the combat of El
Bodon. In August-September 1811 Wellington had been blockading Ciudad
Rodrigo, but in late September Marshal Marmont had
raised the blockade at the head of an army 58,000 strong. Most unusually
Wellington had left his army rather dangerously stretched to the south and west
of Ciudad
Rodrigo while Marmont approached, and on 25 September had nearly paid
for that mistake when a strong French cavalry force had come close to cutting
Wellington’s 3rd Division in half close to El Bodon.
After some hard
fighting the 3rd Division had escaped, but Wellington was still not out of
danger. He had prepared two strong positions where he would have been willing
to fight a defensive battle, one at Fuente Guinaldo, south of Ciudad
Rodrigo, and one at Alfayates (or Alfaiates), thirteen
miles to the west, just across the Portuguese border.
At the end of 25
September Wellington had the 3rd and 4th Divisions with him at Fuente
Guinaldo, along with Pack’s Portuguese brigade and part of his cavalry,
giving him a total of 15,000 men. The Light Division was close by to the east,
although would not reach the camp until the afternoon of 26 September, but the
1st and 6th Divisions had been posted along the Azava (or Azaba) river,
to the west of Ciudad Rodrigo, and it soon became clear that they would not be
able to reach Fuente Guinaldo.
Although Marmont had
made no use of his infantry on 25 September, by the end of the day he had
20,000 infantry facing Wellington, and by noon on 26 September the entire
French army was concentrated to the north of Fuente Guinaldo. If
Wellington had been able to concentrate his entire army at that position, then
he would have been willing to risk a battle, but throughout 26 September he was
in a very vulnerable position.
Luckily for
Wellington, Marmont decided not to attack. His reasoning was entirely logical –
the French believed that in the past Wellington had not been willing to risk a
battle unless he had a strong army in a strong position (they habitually
overestimated the amount of men Wellington had at his disposal during his
battles) – and so if Wellington was happy to spend all day in his position at Fuente
Guinaldo then he must have enough men to defend it.
That night both
armies began to retreat, Wellington west to his next position at Alfayates,
and Marmont back to Ciudad Rodrigo. When Marmont’s rearguard reported that the
British were on the move, he ordered his army to turn around and follow
Wellington. The French pursuit was too distant and too weak to worry
Wellington, and by the end of 27 September he was secure in his new position.
The only fighting
came at Aldea da Ponte, a village to the north east of Alfayates
where several roads met. This position was defended by the pickets of the 4th
Division and Slade’s dragoons. Although it was not part of his main position,
Wellington decided to defend Aldea da Ponte against any minor
attack, and only abandon it if the French attacked in force.
The first French
troops to reach Aldea da Ponte were Wathier’s cavalry. They were soon joined by
Thiébault’s infantry division. At this point the village was defended by the
light companies of the Fusilier brigade. Thiébault decided to send the three
battalions of the 34th Léger to capture the village. One battalion attacked the
village, while the other two outflanked the position, and the light companies
were forced to retreat.
Wellington responded
by sending the entire Fusilier brigade, supported by a Portuguese regiment, to
recapture the village. The French battalion in the village was forced to
retreat, and fusiliers took possession of the village.
This position lasted
only lasted until dusk. Thiébault had been joined by Montbrun’s cavalry
and Souham’s division.
This time it was Souham who attacked the village, and once again the British
were forced to retreat. With darkness approaching, and aware that the village
was not part of his main defensive position, Wellington decided not to attempt
to take it back.
The British and
Portuguese suffered 100 casualties during this combat (71 in the Fusiliers, 13
in the Portuguese regiment and 10 in Slade’s cavalry), while the French lost
around 150 men.
Wellington was now
in a very strong position, with both of his flanks protected by the River Coa
and a front line said to be as strong as that defended at Bussaco. After
examining this position on 28 September Marmont rather sensibly decided not to
attack, and pulled back to Ciudad Rodrigo. On 1 October the
French army was broken up and sent into its winter cantonments, and the danger
to Wellington’s army was over.
